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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah
Court of Appeals Rules*
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the First District Court, Judge F.L.
Gunnell as trial Judge. Judge F.L. Gunnell entered judgment based
on jury verdict and committed Appellant to five years to life in
the Utah State Prison on March 2, 1990. Appellant was convicted of
second degree murder. Appellant appeals his conviction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
refused Appellant's motion for a change of venue when Appellant was
charged with involvement in a brutal beating death that received
enormous newspaper and television publicity and when Appellant was
from the South and had no family or other ties to Brigham City.
Whether the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it refused to suppress numerous items of blood-stained
evidence which were seized in a warrantless and unconstitutional
search and seizure of Appellant's living quarters.
Whether
inflammatory

the

trial

photographs

court

erred

in receiving

and

other

evidence

prejudicial,

despite

pretrial

objections by way of a motion in limine to keep the jury from
viewing such evidence.
Whether

sufficient

evidence exists to sustain the

jury's

verdict of second degree murder where such verdict was based on

Appellant's mere presence at the scene of the crime.
Whether the trial court denied Appellant his constitutional
right to assist in his own d€»fense when it refused to permit him to
view the crime scene as part of his defense.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
allow the jury -to view the crime scene in a situation where so much
depended on the testimony of one or two eyewitnesses who viewed the
events of the crime through an open trailer door in the darkness.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

United States Constitution; Amendment 4
Utah Constitution; Article I; Section 11
Utah Constitution; Article I; Section 12
U.C.A.

§ 76-5-203

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 (i)
Utah Rules of Evidence 403
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was originally charged along with three others in
the beating death of Mike Ramirez.

The three others were Donald

Brown, Ray Cabututan, and William Cummins. Appellant was employed
with these three individuals by Western Brine Shrimp. [T. 128, Vol
I]
Appellant is a newcomer to Utah and has lived most of his life
in the South.

He speaks with a distinct southern accent and has

lived in Louisiana and Texas. [T. 106-107, T. 22, Vol I]

He has

no relatives in Brigham City where the trial was held.
A number of employees including the four above-mentioned
individuals and the victim of the crime, Mike Ramirez, were working
at the Finger Point Camp of Western Brine Shrimp which is on the
west side of the Great Salt Lake in Box Elder County. The camp was
composed of four trailers in which the employees resided. [T. 125128, Vol I]

The victim, Mike Ramirez, resided in a trailer along

with Eddie Apodaca. [T. 126, Vol I]

Ray Cabututan, William

Cummins, Don Brown and Appellant Billy Cayer resided in another
trailer.

Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Sherman Gallardo

resided in a third trailer. [T. 125, Vol I]

The fourth trailer

was reserved for a foreman who was periodically gone from the site.
[T. 126, Vol I]

He was gone from the site on the night of the

crime. [T. 127, Vol I]
On the night of October 25, 1989 a fight got started between
Ray Cabututan and Eddie Apodaca. [T. 145, Vol I]
at Cabututan's trailer. [T. 145, Vol I]
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Eddie was over

Cabututan, Cummins,

Brown, and Cayer were sitting in the trailer consuming alcoholic
beverages, [T. 141, Vol I]

An argument ensued between Cabututan

and Apodaca. [T. 14 4, Vol I]
Vol I]

Cabututan struck Apodaca. [T. 14 5,

Apodaca got up and left this trailer.

Apodaca returned to his trailer and started to explain what
had happened to his roommate, Mike Ramirez.

[T. 14 8, Vol

I]

Sometime afterwards, Brown, Cummins, Cabututan, and Cayer entered
Apodaca and Ramirez's trailer.

[T. 144, Vol I]

jumped up and drew a knife on the four men.
Subsequently, Mike

Mike Ramirez

[T. 153, Vol I]

left the trailer with Cabututan, Brown

Cummins at this time. [T. 154, Vol I]

and

Appellant Cayer remained

inside the trailer at this time. [T. 156, Vol I]

All of the

evidence suggests Appellant Cayer was heavily intoxicated at this
time. [T. 183, Vol I]

Cayer apparently struck Mr. Apodaca several

times during the next thirty minutes. [T. 156-157, Vol I]

These

two were the only individuals inside the trailer at that time.
Outside, Apodaca claims he could hear noises of a beating taking
place. [T. 155, Vol I]

Little conversation appcirently occurred

between Apodaca and the Appellant.
After approximately 3 0 minutes, Appellant left the trailer and
went outside. [T. 160, Vol I]

It must be remembered that all of

these events occurred outside in the dark at about 10:30 p.m. to
midnight. [T. 36, Vol II]

However, there is testimony that at one

point Appellant Cayer was outside standing at the feet of Mike
Ramirez's body. [T. 38, 39, Vol II]

Appellant may have kicked

Mike's feet with his shoe. [T. 69, Vol II]
points

is very slim.

The evidence on these

Cummins, Brown, and Cabututan were
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all

outside around Ramirezfs body.

[T. 38, 39, Vol II]

Richard

Anderson appears to be the only person who testifies Cayer struck
or kicked Ramirez.

This identification was made through an open

door in the dark. [T. 38, Vol II]
The beating ended after about an hour. [T. 48, Vol II]
About 5:00 a.m. the victim, Mike Ramirez, knocked on the door
of Anderson's trailer. [T. 59, Vol II]

Apparently, Ramirez was

able to get up after the fight and drink a cup of water. [T. 60,
Vol II]

Ramirez spoke to Anderson briefly then fell over and

died. [T. 60, Vol II]
Shortly afterwards, Richard and Sherman Gallardo jumped in a
truck

and

drove

to Lakeside.

[T. 60, Vol

II]

There

they

telephoned the Box Elder County Sheriff. [T. 62, Vol II]
Officers T. Lynn Yates, Roger Olsen, Jim Summerill, and Dale
Ward of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office arrived at the camp
between 8:00 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. [T. 247, Vol II; T.4, Vol III]
They arrested Cummins, Brown, Cabututan, and Cayer. [T. 2 63, Vol
II]

Subsequently, the four were held in another trailer, while

the deputies conducted a warrentless search of Appellant's trailer.
[T. 266, Vol II]
including:

A number of items of evidence were seized

white tennis shoes; hip waders; a blue Puma bag with

contents; a pink bag with clothing and other items; a cardboard
box; white folding knife; a bottle of Smirnoff Vodka; a bottle of
Jack Daniels whiskey, a 10 inch crescent wrench. [T. 185-270, Vol
II]
Officer

Ward

took

photographs

of

the

crime

scene

which

included photos of the victim1s body. [P-69, III. 13, P. 9, P. 64,
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P-49].

[T. 4-32, Vol III]

clothing

articles,

and

Numerous pictures of blood stained

pictures

of

bloody

walls;

tools

and

implements were taken as well. [T. 4-32, Vol III]
Prior to the trial of this case, Appellant's counsel filed
motions

to

change

venue,

suppress

illegally

seized

evidence,

exclude prejudicial evidence, and allow Appellant and the jury to
view the crime scene.
Appellant's

These motions were all denied.

first trial

for murder

ended

in a

"hung"

or

deadlocked jury, Appellant was tried foi* the offense of second
degree murder next on February 26, 1990 in Brigham City.

This time

the jury convicted Appellant of Second Degree Murder. [T. 95, Vol
III]
Th€i Court entered judgment and sentenced Appellant to a term
of 5 years to life in the Utah State Prison. [T. 98, Vol III]
Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant did not receive a fair trial in Brigham City because
this was a violent crime, and Brigham City is a small community.
Additionally, there was an unusually

large amount of pretrial

publicity surrounding this "Brine Shrimp Murder Case".

Therefore,

the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion for a change of
venue.
The trial court erred in refusing to grant Appellant's motion
to suppress.
warrantless
trailer.
The

Most evidence in this case was seized pursuant to a
and unjustified

search and

seizure

of

Appellant's

No exigent circumstances justified the search.
trial

photographs

court

erred

and blood-stained

in

refusing

to

exclude

gruesome

objects from the trial as being

unfairly prejudicial.
Insufficient evidence existed to support a guilty verdict for
second degree murder. None of Appellant's conduct met the criteria
under

the

second

degree

murder

statute.

Additionally,

mere

presence at a crime scene does not make one guilty under a theory
of accomplice liability.
The court erred in not allowing the jury to view the crime
scene.

If it had, jurors would have better understood the weak and

scanty nature of eyewitness identification made of Appellant.
The court erred in not allowing Appellant to view the crime
scene following his arrest. The Utah State Constitution guarantees
Appellant the right to participate in his defense and this was
erroneously taken from him.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANTfS MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.
Brigham City is the County seat of Box Elder County.
is quite rural with a good deal of farming and ranching.

The area
According

to the 1980 Census, Box Elder County has a population of 3 6,873
people.

This same census, Brigham City's population was 15,596.

The community is quite closely knit.

Juries from Box Elder County

have something of a reputation for rendering conservative verdicts.
This

crime

received

a

tremendous

amount

of

publicity.

Appellant initially filed a Motion for a Change of Venue with the
Court on February 21, 1990.

Appellant had two trials.

The jury

was unable to reach a verdict at the first trial and deadlocked.
A second trial was held on February 26, 1990.

At this time the

jury returned a verdict of guilty to a charge of second degree
murder.

While this was going on newpapers and television stations

had a virtual "field day". This killing was repeatedly referred to
as the "Brine Shrimp Murder".
by all of the local media.

This jargon was used again and again
Appellant and three others were all

charged and convicted after jury trials of the homicide.

Every

trial received considerable publicity.
The media continually played on the fact that this trial
involved a beating death.
a

stabbing.

A beating death is more shocking than a

shooting

or

Scenes

of

horror

were

continuously

conjured

up in the minds of all of the public who heard

the

unending barrage of publicity concerning the case from its start to
finish.

In fact, the trial Judge acknowledged

8

the voluminous

publicity that this case generated in his opening remarks to the
jury. [See T. 29, Vol I]
In February of 1990, when Appellant's counsel first filed an
affidavit in support of the change of venue, large numbers of
newspaper articles had been written about this case.

Twenty-one

stories had appeared in the Ogden Standard Examiner which has a
circulation of 4800 in Box Elder County.
appeared in the Box Elder News Journal.
5,189.

Thirteen stories had

This has a circulation of

The Tremonton Leader published a total of 9 news stories

about the case at this time. Lengthy and voluminous television and
radio broadcasts have occurred on all of the television stations
which broadcast into this area as well. [ See R. 343-387]
Appellant is not from this area.

He grew up in the South and

has spent most of his life in the state of Louisiana.

His name,

accent, and other personal characteristics quickly tell native
Utahns that he is not from this area.
Appellant's counsel voirdired jury members concerning whether
jurors

had

heard

much

publicity

concerning

this

case.

Mrs.

Cordova, Mr. Wells, Mr. Harlow, Mrs. Penttila, Ms. Hanks, Mr.
Davis, Mr. Rex, Ms. Corsi, Ms. Beede, Mr. Olsen, Ms. Stimpson, who
were on the initial jury panel during the second trial all had
heard something about this case before it came to trial. [T. 60-67,
Vol I]
It was in this climate, that Appellant was forced to stand
trial for his alleged participation in a violent beating death in
which four others participated.

The circumstances were such that

the Appellant simply could not receive a fair trial. This argument
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was made to trial court. The trial court was given a full and fair
opportunity to grant a change of venue and refused to do so.
Subsequently, Appellant was convicted of the crime of second degree
murder by the jury.
In

this

instance

both Utah

State

law and

Constitutional

support Appellant's claim for reversal based upon the trial court's
refusal to grant a change of venue.

The leading case on point

supporting Appellant's argument is State vs. James, 767 P. 2d 549
(Utah, 1989).
son.

The

Mr. James was charged with the murder of his infant

crime

was

committed

in

Cache

County.

Here,

the

defendant, Mr. James, moved for a change of venue on the basis that
pretrial

publicity

and comment made

it impossible

receive a fair trial on a charge of murder,

for him

to

The trial court

rejected this contention and refused to grant a change of venue.
Defendant took an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
The Court considered the case and reversed the decision of the
trial court denying a change of venue.
The court's reasoning in the case was based on a reading of
the rule of criminal procedure that provides for change of venue
and upon a four-prong test.

Appellant will recite the rule of

procedure concerning venue then undertake careful analysis of how
this case relates to the four-prong test will be given.

Rule 29(e)

of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial trial cannot be
had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending,
either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting
forth the facts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
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(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of
the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal
of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free
from the objection and all records pertaining to the case
shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other
county. If the court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court
shall either enter an order denying the transfer or order
a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. [Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e) (ii)].
The operative phrase here appears to be "if the court is
satisfied".

This phrase is clear indication that the intent of the

rule was to give the trial court discretion over the issue of
venue.

It is Appellant's contention that the trial court abused

its discretion in this instance by not transfering venue to another
county.

Appellant reaches this conclusion by a review of the four-

prong test established by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. James,
supra, as applied to the facts of the case at bar.
The

first prong

of the test

set

forth

by

the

court

in

determining whether excessive pretrial publicity may dictate a
change of venue is the standing of the accused and the victim in
the community.

In State vs. James, supra, the Defendant was a

newcomer to Logan and to the Cache Valley.

There was testimony

that he had used drugs shortly before the child's disappearance.
The victim was a child.
In the case at bar, Appellant was from the South and was
essentially a native of Louisiana.

He had lived in Texas as well.

His name, accent, and other factors communicated he was not a
native of Utah. Appellant was a transient laborer working at a low
wage job at a brine shrimp camp located on the western shore of the
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Great Salt Lake far from any town of significant population.
Appellant had never lived in Brigham City and had no family in
either the Brigham City or Box Elder County area.

There was

testimony at the trial that Appellant had consumed quantities of
alcoholic

beverages

prior

to

the

alleged

crime.

In

Utah

(particularly in small towns) predominant religious attitudes are
highly

negative or prejudicial to those who use or consume

alcoholic beverages in any quantity. The victim in this crime was
also a transient laborer. However, the cii^cumstances of his death
(a beating by multiple individuals) created ci grave climate of
prejudice.

Therefore, the standing of the accused and the victim

definitely dictated in favor of a change of venue.
The size of the community was the second prong of the test
that

the

court

relied

upon

in determining

whether

pretrial

publicity may dictate a change of venue. In State v. James, supra,
the court noted that Logan had a population of 28,880 and that
Cache County had a population of 69,200.

The court further noted

that the smaller a community, the greater need there will be for a
change of venue when a heinous crime has been committed.
In the case at bar, the crime was committed in Box Elder
County which had a smaller population than Cache County.
population was 36,873 according to the 1980 Census.

This

The case was

tried (twice) in Brigham City where the population is smaller than
Logan.

This population was 15,596 according to the 1980 Census.

Therefore, the size of the community definitely dictated in favor
of a change of venue.
The nature and gravity of the offense was the third prong of
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the test the court relied upon in considering whether a change of
venue was essential.

In State vs. James, supra, the defendant was

accused of murdering an infant.
offense.

This was potentially a capital

Defendant was finally sentenced to life in prison.

In the case at bar, the Appellant was charged in a violent
beating death in which multiple parties allegedly stood around and
beat another transient laborer to death over a sustained period of
time.

Evidence

showed that the victim probably

hollered during much of the beating.

screamed

and

Other evidence produced

during the trial including boots and other clothing covered with
the victim's blood.

Graphic photographs related to the beating

were introduced as well.

Appellant was convicted of second degree

murder and sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State
Prison.
The nature and the extent of the publicity was the final
factor that the court weighed in State v. James, supra.

The court

mentioned the extensive number of newspaper articles, television
stories,

and

radio

news

broadcasts

concerning

the

case

as

constituting extensive publicity.
In the case at bar, pretrial publicity was no less extensive.
In Appellant's Motion for a Change of Venue no fewer than 4 3
newspaper articles concerning this case and the connected ones are
cited and enclosed.

Television and radio publicity was equally

extensive as it was in the James case.

Appellant was tried twice

for the crime of Second Degree Murder.

The other defendants were

tried as well.

These cases generated enormously publicity.

They

were collectively referred to as the "Brine Shrimp Murder Case".
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Appellant believes that it was impossible for him to receive
a fair trial in this climate. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that there are limits to what a jury can be expected to do*

In

State v. James, supra, the court stated:
Although we do not doubt that twelve persons could be
found who could honestly promise to set aside any prejudicial information which they had heard and any preconceived notions which they had formed, there are
limits to what should reasonably be asked and expected
of prospective jurors who have been exposed to the
events surrounding the alleged crime, [767 P.2d at 549]
The United
accused

of

States and Utah Constitutions

crimes

"due process

of

law".

guarantee

[Amendment

those

14; U.S.

Constitution].[Utah State Constitution; Article I; Section 11].
When th€i trial court refuses a change of venue in this type of
circumstance, it denies an accused the right to have a fair trial.
In this case, Appellant was denied a fair trial.
Consequently, Appellant

asks that this court reverse

the

conviction and the sentence in this case because the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing a change of venue and violated
the Appellant!s constitutional rights to due process of law by
denying him a fair trial.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED IN THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S
LIVING QUARTERS.
Appellant moved the trial court unsuccessfully to suppress
evidence that was seized In an illegal and unlawful search of the
trailer in which he was residing which occurred without a warrant.
Specifically, Deputy Sheriffs from the Box Elder County Sheriff's
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Office responded to an emergency call at the camp.

When the

deputies arrived, they entered a trailer in which Mr. Cayer and the
other defendants in these cases resided.
number of items including:

They thereupon seized a

white tennis shoes; hip waders; a blue

puma bag and contents; pink bag with clothing and other items; a
cardboard box; white folding knife; a bottle of Smirnoff Vodka; a
bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey; and a ten inch crescent wrench.
Defendants were not asked whether they would consent to a
search

of the trailer

in which

all these

items were

seized.

Defendants, and the Appellant did not and would not have consented
to such a search without a warrant.
Searches

conducted

without

a warrant

and

outside

of

the

judicial process are generally invalid and are illegal in the
absent of a few rare circumstances.

Katz v. United States, 389 US

347 (1967). State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984). State
v. Griffin, 626 P.2d

478

(Utah, 1981).

Further, no amount of

probable cause can justify a search absent exigent circumstances.
Coolidcre v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants
all citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.[U.S. Constitution; Fourth Ammendment]
A house trailer would appear to occupy the same status that an
apartment building does.

Tenants in apartment buildings certainly
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have reasonable expectations of privacy in their belongings and
possessions.

The Utah Supreme Court has said as much in the case

of State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Utah, 1967).

Here, defendant was

living in the unit of a Salt Lake City motel.

Police arrested him

at the motel and conducted a warrantless search in which they found
a quantity of narcotics.

The police obtained the consent of the

owner of the motel units prior to conducting the arrest and search.
However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the consent of the owner
of such facilities is not sufficient.

Only an emergency such as a

fire, riot, or escaping criminal suspect could justify a search
without either the consent of the tenant or a warrant.
Appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
trailer

home

because

he

lived

there

and

kept

his

in the
personal

belongings and clothing inside.
No exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless
search and seizure.
anywhere.

There was no means to move the house trailer

So it is not like an automobile.

The housetrailer was

not within the immediate control of the defendants.

All of them

were outside the trailer at the time of their arrest and before the
search.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 725 (1969) 23 L.Ed 685

(1969)
The

absence

of

exigent

circumstances

justifying

the

warrantless search and seizure is clear from the fact that the
defendants were all detained in another trailer for approximately
two hours before the search even began.

It would not have been

difficult for the deputy sheriffs involved in this arrest to have
sent someone to the closest magistrate for a search warrant based
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on probable cause.

Even though the crime scene was located in

rural Box Elder County, two of the sheriffs could have guarded the
men while the third went to seek the search warrant.
The trial court concluded during the hearing on Appellant's
Motion to Suppress that the area of the trailer where the articles
were

seized

was

a

"common

employees at the camp.

area" that

was

utilized

by

other

Accordingly, the court held that there was

no reasonable expectation of privacy in this area.
warrant was required to search the area.

Therefore, no

The court also ruled

exigent circumstances may have justified the search. [T. 118-123,
Suppression Hearing on January 24, 1990]

This reasoning

is

nonsense. This small house trailer constituted the entire living
quarters for the four defendants in this case. Additionally, there
is

evidence

that

the

defendants,

including

Appellant

Cayer

attempted to keep the area as private as possible by asking other
employees to leave who entered it. [T. 104, Vol II]

If this court

upholds the trial court's decision, it will have said that those
who

live

in a housetrailer

in this kind

of

setting

expectation of privacy in their dwelling area whatsoever.

have

no

Such a

result is inconsistent with both the letter and the intent of the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The search was also unreasonable because there was no need for
the deputy sheriffs to search the inner contents of a blue puma bag
and a pink sack which was done after this evidence was seized
during the warrantless search of the trailer.

Even if there was

some far-fetched justification for the search and seizure of the
other items, there was none for examining the contents of these
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bags.

Upon

search, these* bags apparently

contained

items of

clothing,. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a search
of such bags without a warrant is an unlawful search and seizure.
The court stated in United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
that:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or
other personal property not immediately associated
with the person or the arrestee to their exclusive
control, and there is no longer any danger that the
arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a
weapon or destroy evidence, a search of the property
is no longer an incident of arrest.
Here the search was conducted more than an hour after
federal agents gained exclusive control of footlocker
and long after respondents were securely in custody;
the search therefore cannot be viewed as incident to
the arrest or as justified by any other exigency.[53
L.Ed. 2d 551]
Finally, the search was unreasonable because a day later the
sheriffs returned to the trailer

(without a warrant again) and

seized a white folding knife as evidence.

This, of course, was

after the arrested men had been removed from the premises.

As

such, there was a complete lack of justification for the seizure of
this item of evidence without a warrant as well.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AND ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED INFLAMMATORY AND
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND OTHER ITEMS TO BE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE.
During the trial of this case, the trial court admitted into
evidence a number of exhibits of evidence which were inflammatory
and highly prejudicial to the Appellant. These exhibits included:
photographs including the victim's body, blood stained clothing and
other objects and weapons.
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Utah Rule of Evidence 401 provides that all relevant evidence
is admissible

in trials.

However, Utah Rule of Evidence 403

provides an exception to this rule for prejudicial evidence. Rule
403 states as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
In

the

instant

case, graphic

photographs

were

presented

showing the body of the deceased. Other evidence included bloodstained clothing and photographs of blood-stained objects at the
crime scene.

In fact, there was so much of this material, the

prosecutor referred to it as a "mountain of evidence". [T. 103, Vol
I]

Upon viewing this evidence, the court will understand what is

meant.

Appellantfs counsel made a pretrial motion in limine to

keep these items out of evidence.

This motion was denied by the

trial court.
In Utah, the courts determine whether evidence is unfairly
prejudicial by conducting a balancing test. The court balances the
probative value of the evidence against its potentially probative
effect.

If the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the potential

probative value of the evidence, the trial court has the duty to
exclude such photographs and material from evidence.
In the instant case, there was no need to present these
photographs

and

other

blood-stained

evidence.

Eyewitnesses

described the beating of the victim, Mr. Mike Ramirez for the jury.
Additionally, Dr. Todd Gray, M.D., the Utah State Medical Examiner,
appeared for the state as a witness and describe the location and
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the number of wounds that Mr, Ramirez received.

He also told the

jury what he thought was the cause of the victim's death.

Box

Elder County Deputy Sheriff's testified concerning the location of
the body and its condition when it was found.

The only purpose

that the photographs of the victim and other blood-stained evidence
served in this case was to inflame the jury and make them angry at
the Appellant.
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed other criminal convictions
where

such

photographs

were

received

into

evidence

and

the

probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.

In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah, 1986), Defendant

was convicted of second degree murder.

During the trial of the

case, the prosecution had introduced gruesome photographs of the
body of the murder victim.

Defendant's lawyer objected to the

admission of these photographs because of their prejudicial and
inflammatory quality.

The Utah Supreme Court held that it was

prejudicial

admit

Accordingly,

error

to

the

court

these

reversed

photographs

Cloud's

into

conviction.

evidence.
In

its

opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

Regardless of how the matter is viewed, the conclusion
is inescapable that the photographs had no essential
evidentiary value. All that they showed was 'put before the jury readily and accurately by other means
not accompanied by ttie potential prejudice. ' Under
these circumstances, we can only conclude that the
photographs were proffered an used solely for the purpose condemned in Poe I and in Wells—to inflame the
jury. [722 P.2d at 753]
The same result was reached earlier by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah, 1968).
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Here, the defendant

was charged and convicted of first degree murder. During the trial
of this case, the prosecution

introduced

color

slides of the

victim's body into evidence. Defendant objected for reasons of the
prejudicial

quality

of the evidence.

conviction for this reason.
reversed the conviction.

Defendant

appealed

his

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

The court stated in its opinion that:

Initially, it is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to determine whether the inflammatory nature of such
slides is outweighed by their probative value with respect
to a fact in issue. If the latter, they may be admitted
even though gruesome. In the instant case, they had no
probative value. All material facts which could conceivably have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had
been established by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The only purpose served was to inflame and arouse
the jury. [441 P.2d at 515]

In State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court did not reverse the conviction.

However, the court

stated that it was error for the court to admit gruesome pictures
of a murder victim.

The court did not reverse because other

evidence in the case was so overwhelming.

However, the court did

hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
photographs into evidence.
In the instant case, the court must find that the prejudicial
effect

of

probative
witnesses.

the

photographs

value.

and

Evidence

Evidence

of the

of

other
the

evidence

beating

injuries and

was

cause

testified to by the Utah State Medical Examiner.

outweighed
presented

any
by

of death was

Finally, evidence

of the position of the position of the body was testified to by the
deputy sheriffs.
The court must also conclude that this error was harmful and
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prejudicial to Appellant and must reverse his conviction.

The

error was prejudicial because the photographs and other evidence
portrayed a particularly brutal beating death.
depicted the body of the victim.
and

clothing,

it

does

not

Some photographs

After viewing all the photographs

take much

imagination

to

see

why

Appellant could not get a fair trial,

THE CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE IS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support a verdict of second degree murder.

Briefly, the facts in

this case were that Appellant was heavily intoxicated the night
that the beating occurred.

There was testimony that while most of

the beating was occurring, Appellant was inside another trailer
awkwardly swinging his fists at an individual named Mike Apodaca.
Two witnesses testified that by peering through the windows of
their house trailer into the dark night that they could see
Appellant Cayer at the feet of Mike Ramirez, the victim.

No one

could testify that Appellant did anything more than kick at Mr.
Ramiress's feet.
Any

claim

that

a verdict

is unsupported

by

substantial

evidence undergoes a rigid standard of review by the Court of
Appeals.

This standard is set forth in State v. Ireland, 108 Ut.

Adv. Rpt. 3 (Utah, 1989).

Here, the court stated that:

This court will overturn a jury verdict only when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. [108 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 5]
See also State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah, 1985).

92

State v.

Johansson,

680

P.2d
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(Utah,

1984).

Nevertheless,

Appellant's contention that even under this rigid

it

is

standard of

review the jury's verdict is insupportable.
The starting point for the analysis is the second degree
murder statute. The second degree murder statute reads as follows:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the actor:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another; or (b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of another; or
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another;
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of the
first degree. [U.C.A. 76-5-203]

A close review of the record reveals that there simply is no
evidence which suggests that:

(1) that Appellant intended to cause

the death of Mike Ramirez; (2) that Appellant intended to cause
serious

bodily

evidenced

injury

a depraved

to

Mike

Ramirez;

(3)

that

Appellant

indifference to human life or recklessly

engaged in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another.

The

most that the evidence shows is that Appellant hit another person,
Mr. Apodaca with his fists.
feet.

Second, that he kicked the victim's

This does not add up to intent to kill, intent to cause

serious bodily injury, depraved indifference to human life, or
reckless conduct creating a grave risk of death.

This is the case

even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
state.
Nor was there sufficient evidence to justify conviction of
Appellant for second degree murder under a theory of aiding or
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encouraging the offense.

The relevant section of Utah Law which

deals with aiding and abetting is U.C.A. 76-2-202.

This states

that:
Every person acting with the mental state required for
the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, request, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aides another person to engcige in conduct
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
In the instant case, there is very slim evidence to suggest
that Appellant aided or encouraged the murder of Mike Ramirez. The
only

evidence

produced

suggests

that

Appellant

was

highly

intoxicated and got into a clumsy fist fight with Ed Apodaca on the
night of the homicide. Clumsy indeed, because Mr. Apodaca believes
he was struck two or three times over a period of approximately
one-half an hour.

Then, later spotty eyewitness identifications

were made of Appellant standing at the feet of the victims body.
It is settled law that mere presence at the scene of a crime
is insufficient evidence to prove accomplice liability for a crime:
State vs. Hicklef

650 P.2d 1216 (Arizona, 1982).

696 P.2d 1305 (Kansas, 1985).
(Montana, 1984).

State vs. Green,

State vs. Bradford, 683 P.2d 924

Clark County vs. Potter, 663 P.2d 350 (Nevada,

1983) .
In State vs. Kalisz, 735 P.2d
Supreme

Court

reversed

a

criminal

60

(Utah, 1987),

conviction

for

our Utah

aiding

and

abetting in so doing the court constured U.C.A. 76-2-202.

In

Kalisz, the Defendant had been convicted of the crime of robbery.
Evidence presented at trial merely showed that Kalisz furnished
transportation to a robbery.

Our Utah Supreme Court reversed
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Kalisz's

conviction,

holding

that

evidence

presented

was

insufficient to sustain a conviction for this offense.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to offer any
evidence other than Appellant's fight with Ed Apodaca and his
possible presence next to the presence of the victim (victim's feet
at that).

Therefore,

this court must conclude as a matter of law

that that insufficient evidence exists to convict Appellant of the
crime of second degree murder.
This necessitates a reversal of Appellant's conviction for
second degree murder by this court.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
APPELLANT WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE
DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE.
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a
jury view of the crime scene.

The court apparently denied this

request because of the time and distance between the courthouse.
However, such a view would have helped the jury to better
understand the perceptual difficulties that the eyewitnesses in the
case encountered.

The crime took place near midnight in late

October

in a rural area.

lights.

Only one witness could state Appellant Cayer ever struck

Mr. Mike Ramirez's body.
at the victim's feet.

The only lighting was from trailer

This witness testified Mr. Cayer kicked

Then this witness states he left the scene

shortly afterward.
With the verdict hinging on such weak evidence it cannot be
said that a refusal to permit a jury view of the crime scene fell
within the trial court's discretion.
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Rather, such a view would

have contributed greatly to the presentation of a defense based on
inadequate eyewitness identification of Mr. Cayer.

An appropriate

ruling by this court would be to reverse Appellant's conviction on
the ground

that the trial court abused

its discretion

by not

permitting a jury view of the crime scene under Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure 17 (i).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO RETURN TO
THE CRIME SCENE TO ASSIST IN HIS DEFENSE.
Appellant was unconstitutionally not permitted to return to
the crime scene with his counsel as part of pretrial preparation.
The Utah State Constitution provides that:
In Criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by witnesses against him, to have compulsary
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behahf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the offense is
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. [Utah
Constitution; Article I; Section 12]
Appellant contends that he was denied his right to appear and
defend by the refusal of the trial court to let him return to the
crime scene to prepare his defense.

Essentially, the evidence in

this trial shows that AppeLlant was very intoxicated on the night
the homicide occurred.
dark of the night.

The beating of the victim occurred in the

Obviously,

critical in such a situation.

eyewitness testimony was quite

If the Appellant had been allowed to

visit the crime scene this could have served two purposes:
1)

It would have refreshed Appellant's memory concerning the
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events of that evening.
2)

Appellant may have been able to refute some of the spotty

eyewitness identification that was made in the dark.
Under these circumstances the court should conclude that the
trial judge committed prejudicial and reversible error by not
allowing Appellant to return to the crime scene.

CONCLUSION
Appellant did not receive a fair trial because he was forced
to stand trial in a small community for a vicious crime which had
received widespread newpaper, television, and radio publicity. The
trial Court had an opportunity to grant a change of venue, but
refused to do so.
Unconsitutionally seized evidence was admitted as evidence
during Appellant's trial.

Such evidence had a prejudicial effect

where the total evidence against Appellant was slim.

Consequently,

this mandates reversal of the conviction.
Graphic

photographs

and

blood-stained

evidence

which

unfairly prejudicial were received at Appellant's trial.

was
Such

evidence greatly contributed to the jury's verdict of guilty of
second degree murder.

Therefore, the conviction must be reversed.

Insufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction
for second degree murder.

The law requires more than the presence

of an individual at the scene of a crime to sustain his conviction
for committing that crime. Therefore, Appellant's conviction must
be reversed.
The court abused its discretion when it refused to have the
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jury visit the scene of the crime.

The crux of this crime is

supported by scant eyewitness testimony of events occurring in the
dark of the night.
this problem.

A jury view of the scene would have emphasized

Hence, the conviction and sentence must be reversed,

Appellant's right to assist in his own defense was violated
when he was not permitted to visit the scene of the crime.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of October, 1990.

JWvio
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DALE M. DORIUS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a ture and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Plaintiff/Respondentfs attorney,
Office of the Attorney General, State of Utah, Governmental Affairs,
Room 236, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT

84114, this

9th day of October, 1990.

DALlir-ft. DORIUS
Attorney for Appellant

ADDENDUM
Judgment and Commitment form for Appellant
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BWGHAMOlStRtCT
ISTRU

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plai ntiff,
vs,

CRIMINAL NO. B91000061 FS

BILLY D. LAYER,
De-Fendant,

On the 28th day o-F February

1990, appeared Roger F. Baron,

Deputy Box Elder County Attorney, representing the State o-F Utah,
and the de-fendant appeared in person and represented by counsel,
Dale M. D o n a s .
It is ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted by a
jury of the crime of:
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE
as changed in the information; and the Court having asked the
defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not
be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
shown or appearing
defendant

being

to the court, IT IS ADJUDGED that the

is guilty as charged and convicted,

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby committed
to the Utah State P> ison and the Sheriff of Box Elder County is
airected to take him into custody and deliver him to the Warden

Case No.
MICROFILMED

MAR.

2\m

of the Utah State Prison to serve a term of NOT LESS THAN FIVE
(5) YEARS TO LIFE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution and
costs as

determined by the Utah Department of Adult Probation and

Parole and/or the Utah State Beard of Pardons as follows:
a.

Ail attorneys fees paid by Box Elder County for assigned

counsel fcr the defendant.
b.

Investigator fees specifically

incurred by this

defendant and 1/4 of the investigator fees attributable to any
investigator services shared between this defendant and any
codefendants to the extent the same were paid by EBox Elder
U Gu nt y .

c.

One Fourtn

prepared -for

(1/4) of the costs of all

transcripts

this defendant's case or the cases of the

codefendants, to the extent the same were paid by Box Elder
Ccunt y.
d.

Any and all restitution owing to the family of the

victim, Miguel

Ramirez, jointly and severally with the

coaefendants, including but not limited to expenses for
transportation of the body and burial of the body, and jointly
end severally with the codefendants for any amounts paid by the
State of Utah Office o-: Crime Victim Reparations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the original of this Judgment anc
Commitment Ehail

be attested by the Cierl. of the Court and that c

certified cop/ hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other

qualified ot-ficer and that the copy serve as the Commitment o-f
the de-fendant and as the Warrant -For the Sheri-F-f in taking

into

custody , Detaining and delivering said de-fendant.

DATED this _ £ L _

da

V °f

/MjlA£A^^

F.L. BUNNELL
DISTRICT JUDGE

1990.

C

ATTEE

MAILIr!3 CERTIFICATE:
I he^eb^ certify that I mailed a true and correct copy o-f
the ^.ecioinn JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT to Mi. Dale M. D o n u s , P.O,
Bov

U, E* ighap Citv, Utah 84302. postage pi epaid, this

Gd>

C>
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